The contrast between Russian and non-Russian sources is striking.
Looking at maps provided by Russian propaganda outlet RIA FAN on Telegram for some measure of what Russia thinks it’s doing, on Russia’s account, they have advanced well past the Donetsk and Luhansk political boundary, and have cut off a pocket of Ukrainian troops around Donetsk who are now compelled to retreat or be annihilated.
On Russia’s account, the campaign in the south is pushing the boundaries of Odessa on the land, and pushing deep into the interior of Ukraine from the south. It bears slight resemblances to the map of Ukraine shown by Belarus’ head of state, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, on March 1st.
Note, however, that Russian forces in the North and South are far, far off where Lukashenka’s map had them, while the east of Ukraine seems more crowded with units than Lukashenka’s map.
Compare this, now, to the Institute for the Study of War map for today.
I theorized, in the early days of the war, that Russia initially intended a broad slice through the Kharkiv - Dnipro - Zaporizhia axis - essentially up to the Dnieper river - and turned to a more “conservative” territorial goal with the failure of the expansion of the Kharkiv salient in the north, and the Melitopol/Mariupol salient in the south.
These are, respectively, the “optimistic slice” and “conservative slice” scenarios.
The Optimistic Slice scenario would have had the effect of cutting off the eastern third of Ukraine, up to around the natural boundary where the lowland floodplains end and the upper lowlands start; it would have been a coup-de-main on par with Rommel’s advance into France, or Schwarzkopf’s sweep through the desert.
It would have broken Ukraine in two, preventing forces in the east of the country from reinforcing the Kyiv pocket or vice versa; and it would have isolated Ukrainian positions at the old line of contact in the east of the country (where the fighting used to be, before the war broke out).
Conservative Slice, on the other hand, would have been a more limited strategy aimed only at seizing control of the political boundaries of the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, and attempting to arrive at a negotiated settlement - according to Duma speeches last week, sometime around May.
It reflects something of a more asymmetric, counter-insurgency strategy as well. Russia already had fifth-columnists and collaborators ready-to-go in the form of separatists, doubtlessly with lists of journalist and dissidents and political figures to arrest and kill.
A general in ROSGVARDIIA, the Russian National Guard, was recently killed in the south of Ukraine, so we can infer there was a ROSGVARDIIA presence there near Kherson, as well reports of abductions of up to 40,000 civilians from throughout Ukraine.
The Institute for the Study of War notes, further, that attempts to encircle Kyiv have stalled, and no significant progress appears to have occurred on the southern front for several days. It looks as if the east of the Ukraine war is the critical part of the war right now. This also jives with Russia’s apparent and announced scaling-back of war goals, as well as reports of counter-attacks throughout the country in the north and south in BBC, today.
We can factor into this reading, as well, reports of FSB Alpha Group sweeping houses behind the lines in Kherson last week.
And, as well, we can include “evacuations” - really, abductions - reportedly being undertaken by pro-Russian militias in Rubizhne, according to a pro-Russian Telegram channel.
In sum, it looks as if the lines are freezing around a Conservative Slice scenario, while Russia attempts to “clear and hold” territory it’s taken, which it will presumably argue for in a negotiated settlement at some point.
It is somewhat interesting to speculate what purposes the mass abductions have; they are not completely unparalleled in the history of warfare, nor even in Russian history. They may reflect a strategy of limiting civilian casualties and exploiting it for PR, by “evacuating” civilians, bombing their homes to rubble, and then blaming Ukrainians. They may even reflect a broader policy of cultural genocide, or hostage-taking as the Ukrainian foreign ministry holds.
Whatever the reason for it, it’s fairly clear that it’s happening.
The pattern it’s within is also fairly clear.
As a result of the path of least resistance across all the disconnected, distinct prongs of the Russian advance - and, barring any exigent, major changes to outlook - the war seems to be headed for a stalemate and negotiated settlement somewhere along the lines of the Conservative Slice scenario.